When we were in college, my roommate and I spent a train ride debating the merits of Andy Warhol’s art (she was a fan, I was not). In the end, we not only failed to change each other’s opinions, but realized that we didn’t even agree what art was. She double majored in Biomedical Engineering and Art Theory & Practice, and her view was much more expansive than my own.
In retrospect, I can admit that she was right. My view of art was narrow-minded. If I had to proffer a definition of “art” today, I might go with something like:
Art is an intentionally-created module that is designed to reshape the audience’s neural architecture.
By this standard, the big images of soup qualify. So do the happenings.
I recently read a book that analyzed board games using the tools of art criticism and narratology. Obviously, I now think that board games can be art. They’re carefully designed; their creators often seem to have a goal for how each game should make players feel; the combined effects of text, visual components, and even rules can all work toward conveying those feelings.
One drawback to my newfound open-mindedness, though, is that I could probably be convinced that almost any designed object qualifies as art.
For a piece of art to “fail” to change your neural architecture, it would have to be mnemonically invisible – immediately after seeing it, you could look at it again and it would be as though it were the first time. You’d never be able to recall its content or meaning.
Actually, I have read some esoteric, convoluted poetry like that. Words that skimmed over my mind as though each synapse were coated with teflon.
I wasn’t keen on the experience. Minutes had passed, but, because I couldn’t remember anything that I’d read, I’d accomplished nothing. I don’t need to actually understand a poem, I just want for it to make me feel somehow different after I’ve read it. Like Will Alexander’s “The Optic Wraith,” which triggers a mysterious sense of unease even though its meaning squirms away from me:
The Optic Wraith
like a swarm of dense volcano spiders
woven from cold inferno spools
clinging to my palette
like the code from a bleak inventive ruse
my understanding of her scent
is condoned as general waking insomnia
as a cataleptic prairie
frayed at the core
by brushstrokes of vertigo
As Alexander’s words lure me along, I lose my grasp. But although I might not recall any specific lines, if you asked me at the end of its six pages, “So, what did you feel?”, I’d certain know that something inside my brain was different from who I’d been five minutes before.
When I was in college, I felt strongly that art needed to be beautiful. I was wrong. But I still believe that art works better when it’s aesthetically pleasing, because this allows it to more readily infiltrate someone’s mind. If two paintings are both intended to convey the same ideas, but one is more pleasurable to look at, then we can assume that it will be looked at more, and thereby convey the idea more. A charming form helps the piece achieve its function of spreading the creator’s intended message.
And, in terms of judging the quality of art, I obviously still think that the quality of message is important.
For instance, a chair. Every chair you’ve ever sat in was designed by somebody. If you wanted to argue that the chair is a piece of art, I suppose I’d agree with you. And maybe it’s a very good chair: comfortable to sit in, perfectly balanced, pleasing to see when the rising sun illuminates it in the morning. But that doesn’t mean it’s good art.
Indeed, a chair that is bad at being a chair is more likely to be a good artwork. A chair that’s too small or too large, conveying the discomfort of trying to make your way in a world that is primarily concerned with the comfort of bodies unlike your own. Or a gigantic bronze throne that affords you the chance to perch in Baphomet’s lap; it would be an unpleasant place to sit, but perhaps you’d reflect more on Lucifer’s ethic of “speaking truth to power, even at great personal cost.”
When we humans make art, we try to engage the emotions of our audience. Emotionally-charged situations are more memorable; while feeling awe, or anger, or joy, human minds are most likely to change.
And human art is almost always made for a human audience. Our brains evolved both from and for gossip; our prodigious intellect began as a tool to track convoluted social relationships. We’re driven to seek narrative explanations, both because a coherent story makes gossip easier to understand, and because our consciousness spins stories to rationalize our actions after we perform them.
If we considered the world’s most intelligent animal species – like humans, dolphins, crows, elephants, chimpanzees – most have evolved to gossip. Large brains gave our ancestors a selective advantage because they were able to track and manipulate their societies complex social relationships in a way that bolstered survival and breeding opportunities. Indeed, the average elephant probably has more emotional intelligence than the average human, judging from neuron counts in the relevant areas of each species’ brains.
And so, if an elephant were given the freedom to paint (without a trainer tugging on her ears!), I imagine that she’d create art with the intention that another elephant would be the audience. When a chimpanzee starts drumming, any aesthetic message is probably intended for other chimpanzees.
But what about octopus art?
Octopuses and humans haven’t had any ancestors in common for half a billion years. Octopuses are extremely intelligent, but their intelligence arose through a very different pathway from most other animals. Unlike the world’s brilliant birds and mammals, octopuses do not gossip.
Octopuses tend to be antisocial unless it’s mating season (or they’ve been dosed with ecstasy / MDMA). Most of the time, they just use their prodigious intellect to solve puzzles, like how best to escape cages, or find food, or keep from being killed.
Humans have something termed “theory of mind”: we think a lot about what others are thinking. Many types of animals do this. For instance, if a crow knows that another crow watched it hide food, it will then come back and move the food to a new hiding spot as soon as the second crow isn’t looking.
When we make art, we’re indirectly demonstrating a theory of mind – if we want an audience to appreciate the things we make, we have to anticipate what they’ll think.
Octopuses also seem to have a “theory of mind,” but they’re not deeply invested in the thoughts of other octopuses. They care more about the thoughts of animals that might eat them. And they know how to be deceptive; that’s why an octopus might collect coconut shells and use one to cover itself as it slinks across the ocean floor.
Human art is for humans, and bird art for birds, but octopus art is probably intended for a non-octopus audience. Which might require even more intelligence to create; it’s easy for me to write something that a reader like me would enjoy. Whereas an octopus artist would be empathizing with creatures radically different from itself.
If octopuses weren’t stuck with such short lifespans, living in the nightmarishly dangerous ocean depths, I bet their outward focus would lead them to become better people than we are. The more we struggle to empathize with others different from ourselves, the better our world will be.